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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
There is considerable evidence suggesting that the US economy has fundamentally changed
over the last three decades. In particular, several authors have noted a marked decline in
the volatility of real activity and in the volatility and persistence of inﬂation since the early
1980s (see e.g. Blanchard and Simon (2000), McConnell and Perez Quiros (2000), and Stock
and Watson (2003)). What are the reasons behind such a decline? A stream of literature
attributes these changes to alterations in the mechanisms through which exogenous shocks
spread across sectors and propagate over time. Since the transmission mechanism depends
on the structure of the economy, such a viewpoint implies that important characteristics,
such as the behavior of consumers and ﬁrms or the preferences of policymakers, have changed
over time. The literature has paid particular attention to monetary policy. Several studies,
including Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2005), Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004), have argued that monetary policy was ”loose” in ﬁghting inﬂation in
the 1970s but became more aggressive since the early 1980s and see in this change of attitude
the reason for the observed changes in inﬂation and real activity. This view, however, is
far from unanimous. For example, Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Leeper and Zha (2003),
Orphanides (2004), Hanson (2006) suggest that the same policy rule prevailed over the last
30 years, while Sims and Zha (2006) indicate that changes in the variance of exogenous
shocks may be responsible for the fall in volatility and persistence. McConnell and Perez
Quiros (2000), Campbell and Herkovitz (2006),on the other hand, point out that alterations
in the parameters of the private sector can account for the observed changes.
This controversy is not new. In the past rational expectations econometricians (e.g.
Sargent (1984)) have argued that policy changes involving regime switches dramatically alter
private agent decisions and, as a consequence, the dynamics of the macroeconomic variables,
and searched for historical episodes supporting this view (see e.g. Sargent (1999)). VAR
econometricians, on the other hand, often denied the empirical relevance of this argument
suggesting that the systematic portion of monetary policy has rarely been altered and that
policy changes are better characterized as random variations for the non-systematic part
(Sims, (1982)). This long standing debate has now been cast into the framework of ”bad
policy” (failure to adequately respond to inﬂationary pressures), or ”bad luck” (shocks
are drawn from a distribution with time varying moments), and new evidence has been
collected thanks to the development of empirical methods which allow for time variations
in the structure of the economy and in the variance of the exogenous processes. Overall,
2the role that monetary policy had in shaping the observed changes in the US is still open.
This paper provides new evidence on this issue, by estimating a structural time varying
coeﬃcient model with stochastic volatility and identifying monetary policy using robust
sign restrictions. We innovate upon the literature in three important aspects. Relative to
Cogley and Sargent (2005), we take a structural rather than a reduced form approach, while
relative to Primiceri (2005), who use a-theoretical Choleski scheme, we identify monetary
policy shocks using restrictions consistent with a large class of currently used DSGE mod-
els. Relative to Stock and Watson (2003), and Biovin and Giannoni (2006), we propose
a method to trace out the eﬀects of changes in the parameters of the policy rule, which
builds on the work of Gallant et. al. (1996) and Koop et. al. (1996). Finally, rather than
associating the timing of the changes in monetary policy with variations in output growth
and inﬂation dynamics, we quantify the contribution of the systematic and non-systematic
part of monetary policy to the observed variations.
We work with sign restrictions in the identiﬁcation process for two reasons. The contem-
poraneous zero restrictions conventionally used are often absent in those theoretical models
one employs to guide the interpretation of the results. In addition, while the restrictions
we employ are robust to the parameterization, common to both ﬂexible and sticky price
models (see e.g. Gambetti et. al., 2005), and independent of whether the economic envi-
ronment delivers determinate or indeterminate solutions (see e.g. Lubik and Schorfheide,
2004), those imposed by more standard approaches leave the system underidentiﬁed if inde-
terminacies are present. Our methodology to conduct counterfactuals is preferable because
the conditional covariance structure implied by the structural model is used to trace out
the eﬀect of diﬀerent policy scenarios. Hence, changes in policy parameters may trigger
changes in the parameters of the private sector, if the two set of parameters are correlated.
We show that the transmission of policy shocks has been relatively stable over time
and detect signiﬁcant changes - which make monetary shocks more powerful in aﬀecting
inﬂation and real activity - only in the latter part of the sample. As in Sims and Zha (2006),
we ﬁnd posterior evidence of a considerable decrease in the variance of the policy shock.
However, we document that policy shocks explain a small fraction of the average variability
and persistence of output growth and inﬂation and that the decline in inﬂation variability
comes from sources other than the monetary policy shocks. Our posterior analysis does not
support the idea that monetary policy has become signiﬁcantly more aggressive in ﬁghting
inﬂation since the early 1980s, nor do we ﬁnd overwhelming evidence that a weak response
of interest rates to inﬂation is suﬃcient to explain the 1970s. However, we do ﬁnd that the
3posterior median of the long run inﬂation coeﬃcient in the policy equation was low in the
1970s, and that increased after Volker was appointed chairman of the Fed. Finally, we show
that a more aggressive inﬂation policy would have reduced the level and the persistence of
inﬂation, but the real costs would have been substantial.
Overall, while the crudest version of the ”bad policy” hypothesis has low posterior sup-
port, the evidence we uncovered is consistent both with more sophisticated versions of this
proposition (see Schorfheide (2005)), as well as with alternative hypotheses suggested in the
literature. To disentangle the various possibilities, a model in which preferences, technolo-
gies and the distributions of the shocks are allowed to change along with the preferences of
the Fed is needed. While such a model is still too complex to be estimated (see e.g. Rubio
Ramirez and Fernandez Villaverde (2007)), approximations of the type employed in Canova
(2005), can shed important light on this issue.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical model,
section 3 the estimation procedure, section 4 the results and section 5 the conclusions.
2T h e e m p i r i c a l m o d e l
Let yt be a vector including a short term interest rate, the inﬂation rate, output growth
a n dM 2g r o w t hi nt h a to r d e r .W ea s s u m et h a tyt admits the representation:
yt = A0,t + A1,tyt−1 + ... + Ap,tyt−p + εt (1)
where A0,t contains time-varying intercepts, Ai,t are matrices of time-varying coeﬃcients,
i =1 ,...,p and εt is a Gaussian white noise with zero mean and time-varying covariance
matrix Σt.L e tAt =[ A0,t,A 1,t...,Ap,t],a n dθt = vec(A0
t), where vec(·) is the column stacking
operator. We assume that all the roots of the VAR polynomial lie outside the unit circle at
every t -t h i si ss u ﬃcient to make yt locally stationary. Given this condition, we postulate
the following law of motion for θt:
θt = θt−1 + ωt (2)
where ωt is a Gaussian white noise with zero mean and covariance Ω.W el e tΣt = FtDtF0
t,
where Ft is lower triangular, with ones on the main diagonal, and Dt a diagonal matrix. Let
σt be the vector of the diagonal elements of D
1/2
t and φi,t, i =1 ,...,n−1 the column vector
formed by the non-zero and non-one elements of the (i +1 ) -th row of F−1
t . We assume:
logσt =l o gσt−1 + ξt (3)
φi,t = φi,t−1 + ψi,t (4)
4where ξt and ψi,t are Gaussian white noises with zero mean and diagonal covariance matrix
Ξ and Ψi, respectively. We also assume that ψi,t is independent of ψj,t,j6= i,a n dl e t
φt =[ φ0
1,t,...,φ 0
n−1,t], ψt =[ ψ0
1,t,...,ψ0
n−1,t],a n dΨ b et h ec o v a r i a n c em a t r i xo fψt. Finally,
we assume ξt, ψt, ωt, εt are mutually uncorrelated at all leads and lags. In principle, one
could make εt and ωt correlated. However, it is well known that such a model can be
equivalently represented with a setup where shocks are mutually uncorrelated but εt is
serially correlated. Since our measurement equation is a VAR, such a ﬂexibility is unneeded
here. Note that the speciﬁcation in (3) and (4) is similar to the one employed by Primiceri
(2005). Relative to Cogley and Sargent (2005), it allows ψt 6=0at each t.
The dynamic of yt can be studied using the instantaneous (local) MA representation




where C0,t = I, μt =
P∞






is a function selecting the ﬁrst n rows and n columns of the matrix X. Our analysis will
focus on the variability and the persistence of inﬂation and output growth and on the
contribution of monetary shocks to these statistics. The variance of yit is given by the i-th
diagonal element of Vt(yt),i . e .Vt,i,i(yt)=(
P∞
k=0 Ck,tΣtC0
k,t)i,i. We measure persistence as
the i-th element of the spectral density matrix at frequency zero, normalized by the variance
of the series, that is, we use Pt,i,i(yt)=
ft,i,i(yt,0)







2.1 Characterizing Monetary Policy
We are interested in three features of monetary policy: the transmission of policy shocks;
their variance and the parameters of the policy rule.
2.1.1 Identifying monetary policy
To identify a policy shock we impose three restrictions: a policy shock (i) is orthogonal to all
other shocks; (ii) it increases the interest rate for two periods; (iii) it reduces output growth,
inﬂation and money growth for two periods. To obtain shocks with these characteristics we
let Gt be the unique lower triangular matrix such that GtG0
t = Σt,a n dl e tht be a unit vector,
uniformly distributed over the unit-sphere, satisfying (ii)-(iii). Responses to the policy shock
are IRy(t,k)=Ck,tGtht and the proportion of variance and persistence of yit explained by
























i is the contribution of the policy shock to
the spectral density of yit at frequency zero.
5We choose to work with sign restrictions to identify shocks for two reasons. First, the
contemporaneous zero restrictions conventionally used are often absent in those theoretical
(DSGE) models economists like to use to guide the interpretation of VAR results. Second, a
set zero restrictions, which satisﬁes the standard order condition for identiﬁcation, does not
deliver an identiﬁed system in the case of indeterminacy (in this case, there are at least n+1
shocks). As shown by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), a small scale version of the model used
in Gambetti et. al (2005), delivers the same qualitative implications we use as identifying,
both in determinate and in indeterminate scenarios.
Canova and Paustian (2007) showed that sign restrictions work well in recovering the
features of the DGP if the shock one wants to identify has large variance or if restrictions are
abundant. Since monetary shocks are typically considered a minor source of contemporane-
ous output growth and inﬂation ﬂuctuations, one must insure that enough restrictions are
imposed to make the analysis meaningful. We have experimented identifying just the mone-
tary shock and imposing restrictions at various horizons, and jointly identifying a monetary,
a real demand and a supply shock using only contemporaneous restrictions. The results we
present are robust to these variations. Hence, the signal that policy shocks produce appears
to be strong enough to allow sign restrictions to properly work.
To obtain the parameters of the policy rule, we assume that the interest rate equation
contains a systematic component, given by the response of the interest rate to its own lags
and the lags and contemporaneous values of inﬂation, output growth and money growth;
and a non-systematic component, the policy shock. By inverting GtHt,w h e r eHt is an
orthonormal matrix whose ﬁrst column is ht,t h eﬁrst equation of the structural VAR is
h0
tG−1
t yt = h0
tG−1
t A0,t + h0
tG−1
t A1,tyt−1 + ... + h0
tG−1
t Ap,tyt−p + e1,t (6)
In (6) e1,t is an orthogonal white noise with unit variance, γ0,t = h0
tG−1







t Ap,t]0 contains the structural parameters on contempora-
neous and lagged variables.
To calculate the variance of the policy shock, we normalize the contemporaneous interest




tgte1,t and its variance
is (1/h0
tgt)2,w h e r egt is the ﬁrst column of Gt.
2.2 Policy counterfactuals
Evaluating the eﬀects of hypothetical actions is important to understand to what extent
monetary policy is responsible for the observed changes. However, such an exercise is far
6from trivial and most of the counterfactuals present in the literature are poorly designed.
To understand why consider the following example. Suppose we want to evaluate whether
changing the policy rule prevailing in period j changes X, a vector of statistics of yt (i.e.
variances, correlations, etc.). To perform such an exercise one typically draws the coeﬃcients
of the policy rule from the distribution obtained in period j0 6= j and all the other coeﬃcients
from the distribution obtained in period j, generates data, computes X and compares it
with the actual one. Such an approach is incorrect since the coeﬃcients of the reduced form
are correlated (Ω is, in general, a full matrix). Therefore, when policy coeﬃcients vary,
structural coeﬃcients in the other equations will vary as well. This correlation structure
is disregarded when standard counterfactuals are performed. Furthermore, if the draws for
the policy coeﬃcients in period j0 are improbable or implausible from the point of view
of the distribution of these coeﬃcients in period j, the outcomes of the experiment are
unreliable. The method we propose avoids these problems. While we exclusively focus on
the parameters of the policy rule, the methodology is general and can be employed to study
variations in any set of structural parameters of interest.
Structural VAR parameters can be written as linear combinations of the reduced form
parameters, i.e. γt =( J−1
t
N
Inp+1)θt,w h e r eJ−1
t = H0
tG−1
t and Inp+1 is a np +1identity
matrix. Consequently, they evolve according to
γt =( J−1
t ⊗ Inp+1)(J−1
t−1 ⊗ Inp+1)−1γt−1 + ηt (7)
where ηt =( J−1
t
N
Inp+1)ωt is the vector of shocks to structural parameters. Let ˜ ηt =
˜ Jtωt be a subvector of ηt containing the shocks of interest and ˜ Jt a matrix formed by the
appropriate rows of (J−1
t ⊗ Inp+1).T ot r a c eo u tt h ee ﬀects ˜ ηt, one can use a version of the
generalized impulse response approach of Gallant et. al. (1996) and Koop et. al. (1996).
Assume that information on yt−1,θ t−1, Ω and ˜ Jt is available. The dynamic eﬀect at t + k,
k =0 ,1,2,..., produced by a shock ˜ ηt of size δ can be obtained as the diﬀerence between
two conditional expectations of yt+k a
GIRy(t,k)=E(yt+k|yt−1,θ t−1, ˜ Jt,Ω, ˜ ηt = δ)−E(yt+k|yt−1,θ t−1, ˜ Jt,Ω) k =1 ,2,... (8)
The way we have setup these conditional expectations implies that the shock could be
reversed in the future. We chose this option because results are more stable and because the
chance of drawing an explosive path is smaller. To make the shock permanent it is suﬃcient
to modify the information set of the ﬁrst conditional expectation setting all future shocks to
the coeﬃcients to zero, i.e. the ﬁrst conditional expectation is E(yt+k|yt−1,θ t−1, ˜ Jt,Ω, ˜ ηt =
7δ, ˜ ηt+k
t+1 =0 ) .
In this paper, we are interested in performing the following experiment: what would
happen to inﬂation and output growth dynamics if monetary policy were more aggressive
in ﬁghting inﬂation - where ”more aggressive” means that the long run inﬂation coeﬃcient
in the policy rule is larger. To undertake such an experiment we assume that ˜ ηt includes
the shocks to the coeﬃcients of lagged inﬂation and lagged interest rate of the monetary
policy rule and set δ equal to the posterior standard error for shocks to the coeﬃcients of
lagged inﬂation and zeros for shocks to the coeﬃcients of the lagged interest rate. Since
this ensures that the long run response to inﬂation increases, our design allows us to claim
that monetary policy was uniformly tighter in the experiment. Furthermore, our choice of
δ implies that the change was ”typical”, in the sense of Leeper and Zha (2003) relative to
the sample.
3 Estimation
The TVC-VAR model is estimated using Bayesian methods. We use quarterly data in the
exercise: data from 1959:1 up 1967:1 is used to calibrate the priors and data from 1967:2
to 2006:4 to estimate the model. Letting ˆ x denote the OLS estimate of parameter x,the
prior densities are p(θ0)=N(ˆ θ, ˆ Vθ), p(φ0)=N(ˆ φ, ˆ Vφ), p(logσ0)=N(log ˆ σ,In) p(Ω)=
IW(0.0005 × (dim(θ)+1 )× ˆ Vθ,(dim(θ)+1 ) ) , p(Ξ)=IW(0.001 × 5 × In,5), P(Ψi)=
IW(0.001 × (i +1 )× ˆ Vφ,i+1 ) . W es e tp = 2 . F o re a c hy e a ri nt h ee s t i m a t i o ns a m p l e ,
we identify the monetary policy shock. This means that we collect 40 impulse response
functions, one for each of year in the sample. The data is from the FRED data base of
the Federal Reserve Bank of San Louis. For the short term interest rate we use the federal
funds rate (FEDFUNDS), for inﬂation the growth rate of the GDP deﬂator (GDPDEF),
for output growth the growth rate of real GDP (GDPC1) and for money growth the growth
rate of M2 (M2SL). The mnemonic used by FRED are in parenthesis.
Posterior distributions for the structural parameters are not available in a closed form.
MCMC methods are used to draw from the posteriors. Estimation of reduced form TVC-
VAR models is rather standard: it requires treating time varying parameters (coeﬃcients,
covariations and volatilities) as separate blocks in a Gibbs sampler algorithm. The particu-
lar implementation we use follows Primiceri (2005). Let x be a (q×1) vector, and let xT be
the sequence [x0
1,...,x 0
T]0. Each cycle of the Gibbs sampler requires sampling from the con-
ditional distributions of (σT,s T,φ T,θT,Ω,Ξ,Ψ),w h e r esT is an indicator function deﬁned
8in the appendix. Details on how to sample from these distributions are in the appendix.
Given draws for the parameters, sequences for the unobservable states of the model
can be obtained by running ﬁrst the Kalman ﬁlter through the sample. Then, given the
conditional mean and variance of the terminal state, the mean and the variance of the states
at t ∈ [T − 1,1] are obtained using standard backward Kalman recursions.
Under regularity conditions and after a burn-in period, iterations on these steps produce
draws from the joint posterior density of the parameters. 100000 iterations are performed.
CUMSUM graphs are used to check for convergence and the chain appears to have con-
verged, roughly, after 5000-6000 draws. The densities for the parameters are typically well
behaved. We discard the ﬁrst 50000 and keep one every 5 of the remaining 50000 draws to
break the autocorrelations of the draws and discard all the draws generating non-converging
responses. Once draws from the posterior distributions of the reduced form parameters are
obtained, structural analysis is performed applying the identiﬁcation ﬁlter and keeping the
draws satisfying the restrictions.
As mentioned our model features two shocks: shocks to the variables of the VAR and
shocks to the coeﬃcients of the model. Computing responses to monetary policy shocks is
rather standard. The next algorithm summarizes the steps needed.
1. Draw θt and Σt, compute the lower triangular matrix Gt such that GtG0
t = Σt.
2. Draw wt from a n-variate standard normal and set ht = wt/||wt||.
3. Compute Cj,tGtht for j =0 ,...,J,w h e r eJ is the number of periods for which sign
restrictions have to be satisﬁed.
4. If the restrictions hold, store the responses.
5. Repeat 1-4, until M draws are found.
To compute responses to shocks to the coeﬃcients of the policy rule for horizon k =
1,...,K,l e tyt =[ y0
t,0(n−1)p]0, A0t =[ A0
0t,0(n−1)p]0. and proceed as follows:
1. Draw θt−1 and Ω.D r a w{ωt+K
t } from a N(0,Ω), compute {θt+K
t } and construct the
sequences of companion matrices {At+K
t } of the system.
2. Iterate on yt = A0,t+Atyt−1 for K periods. Since ωt and εt are independent, εt does
not enter the computations. Save the ﬁrst n elements of yt+K
t ,i . e .yt+K
t .





t as a realization of E(yt+k|yt−1,θ t−1, ˜ Jt,Ω),
k =1 ,...,K.
4. Repeat steps 1-3 M times.
5. Draw θt−1, Ω and ˜ Jt (available from the identiﬁcation procedure). Draw ωt con-
ditional to ˜ ηt, from a Normal distribution with mean Ω ˜ J0
t( ˜ JtΩ ˜ J0
t)−1δ and variance
Ω − Ω ˜ J0
t( ˜ JtΩ ˜ J0
t)−1 ˜ JtΩ compute θt and construct At.D r a w {ωt+K
t+1 } from a N(0,Ω),
compute {θt+K
t+1 } and the implied {At+K
t+1 }.
6. Iterate on yt = A0,t+Atyt−1,Kperiods; save the ﬁrst n elements of yt+K
t ,i . e .yt+K
t .





t as a realization of E(yt+k|yt−1,
θt−1, ˜ Jt,Ω, ˜ ηt = δ), k =1 ,...,K.
8. Repeat steps 5-7 M times.
9. Take the diﬀerence between the M stored values of E(yt+k|yt−1,θ t−1, ˜ Jt,Ω, ˜ ηt = δ)
and E(yt+k|yt−1,θ t−1, ˜ Jt,Ω), and compute the percentiles of interest.
The results we present below are obtained setting M=10000 and L=50.
4T h e R e s u l t s
We organize the presentation of the results around three general themes, which should shed
some light on the contribution of monetary policy to the changes experienced in the US over
the last 30 years: (i) Are there changes in the propagation and the variance of monetary
policy disturbances? (ii) To what extent changes in the transmission and in the variability
of monetary policy shocks explain the time proﬁle of the variability and the persistence of
output growth and inﬂation? (iii) Do the coeﬃcients of the systematic part of the policy
rule display signiﬁcant variations? Would it have made a diﬀerence for macroeconomic
performance if monetary policy had been more aggressive in ﬁghting inﬂation?
Figure 1 presents the time proﬁle of reduced form estimates of the posterior median
(solid line) and of the highest 68 percent posterior interval (dotted lines) for the volatility
(standard deviation) and persistence of inﬂation and output growth. Overall, the evidence
conﬁrms what we know from the literature (see e.g. Stock and Watson (2003) or Pivetta
and Reis (2007)). The median of the posterior distribution of the two volatility measures
has two peaks, one in 1974 and one in 1979, and it drops sharply at the beginning of the
101980s. Since the 68 percent interval also shrinks at that time, there is posterior evidence
that the so-called Great Moderation is indeed an important phenomenon. Consistent with
the evidence of Cogley and Sargent (2005), the posterior median of inﬂation persistence falls
at the beginning of the 1980s. Since the 68 percent posterior interval shrinks only in the late
1980s, persistence in the 1980s is a-posteriori indistinguishable from the one of the 1970s
- here and in the next subsections, such a statement means that the posterior distribution
of the diﬀerence between the estimates obtained at any date in the 1970s and 1980s always
includes the zero line. The posterior median of output growth persistence is on average
higher up to the early 80 than later and displays two peaks roughly synchronized with
those in output growth volatility. Posterior uncertainty is however large making changes
insigniﬁcant.
4.1 Are there changes in the propagation of policy shocks?
Figures 2a and 2b present the time proﬁle of the posterior median responses of inﬂation
and output growth to identiﬁed policy shocks for horizons ranging from 1 to 12 quarters.
The ﬁgures are constructed so that, in each year, the shock is of equal size. This allows
us to isolate changes in the transmission mechanism from changes in the magnitude of the
shocks over time. The shape of both output growth and inﬂation responses is similar over
time. Inﬂation falls on impact and then reverts back to its pre-shock level after about one
year. Output growth also falls on impact and the eﬀect is slightly more persistent - it takes
about 6 quarters to revert back to the pre-shock level.
Some quantitative diﬀerences in the median responses of both output growth and in-
ﬂation are present but not around the end of the 1970s, as the literature suggests. What
is clear instead is that, after an initial decline, the absolute value of the instantaneous re-
sponses of both output growth and inﬂation increases by 2 to 3 times in the 1990s and the
responses in 1996 and 2006, the dates with the largest eﬀects, are a-posteriori diﬀerent from
the responses of the 1980s. Since the response of the interest rate is practically unchanged
over time, one must conclude that discretionary monetary policy has become more eﬀec-
tive in inﬂuencing output growth and inﬂation in the later part of the sample. Figure 2c
reports the time proﬁle of the posterior distribution of the variance of output growth and
inﬂation that would have resulted if policy shocks with constant variance would have been
the only disturbances present in the economy1 (we plot the median and the highest 68 per-
cent credible interval). Clearly, the pattern displayed in the ﬁgure is inconsistent with the
1This corresponds to the sum of squared impulse response functions.
11variance moderation experienced in the US: since the non-systematic component of policy
has become more eﬀective, output growth and inﬂation would have been more volatile in
the 1990s-2000s than in the 1970s. Hence, the fall in the variance of output growth and
inﬂation cannot come from changes in the transmission of policy shocks, and it must be
generated by either a reduction of the variance of the policy shocks or by changes in the
propagation of some non-policy shocks.
4 . 2 A r et h e r ec h a n g e si nt h ev a r i a n c eo fp o l i c ys h o c k s ?
Figure 3 displays the time proﬁle of the median and the highest interval containing 68
percent of the posterior distribution of the standard deviation of the estimated policy shock.
As in Sims and Zha (2006), we ﬁnd that the median of the distribution is higher, on average,
before 1985 than afterward. In addition, we ﬁnd that posterior uncertainty falls up to 1998.
Consequently, the volatility peak of 1980 is a-posteriori diﬀerent from, say, the volatility
present in the late 1990s. Interestingly, the volatility peak lags the volatility peak in inﬂation
and output growth presented in ﬁgure 1 by one year and it is probably the result of Volker’s
choice of targeting monetary aggregates. Hence, the fall in these statistics may not have
much to do with changes in the non-systematic component of policy.
4.3 Inﬂation and output growth dynamics and policy shocks
The previous two subsection have shown that the transmission of the policy shocks have
very little to do with changes in the dynamics of inﬂation and output growth persistence
and volatility. Furthermore, while the upward trend of the 1970s in the volatility of the
policy shock is correlated with the upward trend in these statistics, the start of the Great
Moderation predates the estimated fall in the volatility of the policy shocks.
To provide additional evidence on the role of monetary policy, we study whether the
contribution of monetary policy shocks to the variability and persistence of inﬂation and
output growth, which depends on both changes in the transmission of policy shock and
in their variances, has changed in a manner with which consistent with giving monetary
policy a causal role in the process. Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2005) found that there is
synchronicity between changes in persistence and a narrative account of monetary policy
changes. Since we perform a structural analysis, we can provide a quantitative assessment
on the contribution of monetary policy shock to the observed changes.
Figure 4, which reports the time proﬁle of the posterior median (solid line) and the pos-
terior 68 percent interval (dotted lines) of contribution of the policy shock to the volatility
12and persistence of inﬂation and output growth, displays interesting features. The contri-
bution of policy shocks is on average higher after 1985 for inﬂation volatility (18 percent
vs. 12 percent), and on average lower after 1985 for output growth volatility (17 percent
vs. 14 percent). The percentage of the persistence of inﬂation attributable to the monetary
policy shock is roughly constant over time and low (about 10 percent), while the percentage
of persistence of output growth accounted for by monetary policy shock almost doubles
starting in 1990 (from 10 percent to more than 20 percent). Finally, and consistent with
previous evidence, the posterior intervals around these median shares are large, making the
changes a-posteriori insigniﬁcant.
In sum, the importance of the non-systematic component of monetary policy in shaping
t h et i m ep r o ﬁle of inﬂation and output growth dynamics is limited. Our analysis fails to
detect important changes in the transmission of policy shocks in the 1980s; we do ﬁnd that
changes in the variance of the policy shock are related to the swings in the time proﬁle of
inﬂation and output growth volatility and persistence in the 1970s but the level of these
statistics explained by policy shocks is small and the ”Great Moderation ” phenomena
predates the trend fall in the volatility of policy shocks. Furthermore, at least for inﬂation
volatility, the contribution of monetary policy shocks has increased over time. Given that
volatility has fallen, it must be the case that the contribution of shocks other than monetary
policy has fallen dramatically since the 1980s.
4.4 The evolution of the coeﬃcients of the policy rule
Characterizing the time proﬁle of the systematic part of monetary policy is important
because the response of the interest rate to economic conditions is part of the propagation
mechanisms of all exogenous shocks. Hence, the systematic component of monetary policy
could have inﬂuenced the dynamics of inﬂation and output growth even when policy shocks
play a limited role.
Figure 5 presents the evolution of the posterior median (solid line) and the posterior 68
percent interval (dotted lines) for the three long run coeﬃcients in the policy rule. The long
run coeﬃcient on inﬂation is the relevant measure to evaluate how policy has responded to
inﬂation over time: the higher the value, the more aggressive has monetary policy been in
that period. If a bad monetary policy is responsible for the pattern of high inﬂation and
output growth volatility and persistence in the 1970’s, we should detect a signiﬁcant and
permanent increase in the location of the posterior distribution at the beginning of 1980s.
The posterior median of the long run inﬂation coeﬃcient is indeed low and often below
13one in the 1970s, and increases in 1981 to a level which is consistent with the conventional
wisdom (about 1.8). However, it slowly declines up to 1997; it increases around the start of
the millennium, and falls once more at the end of the sample. Since posterior uncertainty is
large and tends to increase over time, the jump in the location of the distribution observed
in 1981 is a-posteriori insigniﬁcant.
The time proﬁle of variations in the posterior median of the output growth coeﬃcients
is also interesting. In particular, while policy looks countercyclical in the long run up to
the beginning of the 1980s - the median value of the long run output growth coeﬃcient is
negative - it becomes procyclical after that. Since the beginning of 1980s, this coeﬃcient
has been generally small. While posterior uncertainty is quite large and this makes changes
insigniﬁcant, one can notice a shift of the posterior mass from below zero in the 1970s to
above zero since the early 1980s.
The evidence is therefore consistent with the idea that monetary policy was loose in the
1970s and turned more aggressive with Volker’s appointment as chairman of the Fed but
the change appears to be a-posteriori insigniﬁcant. The fact that inﬂation was lower and
much more stable over the last ten years then in the 1970s indicates that we need a more
complicated set of circumstances than a loose policy to produce the perverse outcomes of
the 1970s. Hence, the crudest version of the ”bad policy” hypothesis seems to be at odds
with the data: there is no signiﬁcant increase in the inﬂation coeﬃcient of the policy rule
nor overwhelming evidence that violation of the Taylor’s principle is suﬃcient to explain
the 1970s. The countercyclical nature of the long run output growth coeﬃcient is consistent
with the idea that the policy authority was mismeasuring output in the 1970s. However, the
fact that this coeﬃcient was negative even before the 1970s, casts doubts on explanations
which rely on large mismeasurements of output to explain the increase in inﬂation volatility
just after the ﬁrst oil shock.
4.5 What if monetary policy would have been more aggressive?
It is common to argue, by mean of counterfactuals, that monetary policy failed in stabilizing
inﬂation in the 1970s (see e.g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), Boivin and Giannoni (2006))
and that, had it followed a more aggressive stance, dramatic changes in the economic
performance would have resulted. While exercises of this type are meaningful only in
dynamic models with clearly stated microfundations, our structural setup allows us to
approximate the ideal type of exercise without falling into the Lucas-critique type of traps,
provided that the monetary policy equation we have identiﬁed is structural, and that the
14estimated correlation among coeﬃcients is used in the experiment. The counterfactual we
are interested in is the following: what would have happened if the policy response to
inﬂation was signiﬁcantly stronger, where by this we mean an increase in the long run value
of the inﬂation coeﬃcient? Since the model is non-linear, the quantitative outcomes of such
an experiment depend on the size of δ and which coeﬃcients entering the long run values
are changed. Let i =1 ,2,...indicate the SVAR coeﬃcients entering this long run measure.
We set δi equal to the posterior standard deviation of the shock for all coeﬃcients on lagged
inﬂation and equal to zero for the coeﬃcients of lagged interest rate.
We have computed responses for several values for δ and, while quantitatively the results
change, the qualitative features we emphasize are unaltered. However, we should mention
that increasing the size of the δ makes it more likely that the system ends up in an unstable
region and this creates considerable computational problems.
Figures 6a and 6b plot, respectively, the response of inﬂation and output growth to this
shock. On the vertical axis we report percentage changes of output growth and inﬂation
from their long run mean value in the years reported on the horizontal axis. A more
aggressive stance would have had, as expected, important inﬂation eﬀects: inﬂation falls
at all dates we consider. The response of inﬂation to the shock is hump shaped, with the
largest eﬀect occurring after about ten-ﬁfteen quarters. The fall is persistent and after
about 10 years inﬂation would have been on average 0.1 percentage points lower. A tougher
stance against inﬂation, however, would not have been painless. To reduce inﬂation by 1
percent one year after the shock, output growth should have fallen on impact by about
1.0-1.2 percent (1.2-4.0 percent after one year) and stay signiﬁcantly below its long run
value for 20 quarters.
Figure 7 shows the eﬀects of a more aggressive inﬂation stance for inﬂation persistence.
The solid line is the posterior median of inﬂation persistence computed using structural
draws from the posterior distribution of θt and Σt (we refer to this as unconditional per-
sistence). The dotted line is the persistence evaluated at E(θt|θt−1, ˜ Jt,Ωt, ˜ ηt = δ) (we refer
to this as conditional persistence). The diﬀerence between the two is the expected eﬀect
on inﬂation persistence of an increase in the inﬂation coeﬃcients of the policy rule. The
conditional persistence measure is systematically below the unconditional one. Hence, a
more aggressive stance against inﬂation would have reduced inﬂation persistence. However,
the diﬀerence between the two measures is small - less than 10 percent - and a-posteriori
insigniﬁcant. Hence, a much larger shock would have been necessary to signiﬁcantly reduce
persistence making the output growth costs dramatic.
15In sum, while there was room for stabilizing inﬂation in the 1970 in terms of levels, such
a stabilization would not have had major eﬀects on inﬂation persistence and, given the large
output growth costs, would have required considerable social consensus to be implemented.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper provides novel evidence on the contribution of monetary policy to the structural
changes observed in the US economy over the last 30 years. From a methodological point of
view we innovate in three respects: we provide (i) a sign scheme to identify monetary shocks
in a TVC-VAR; (ii) a new method for conducting policy experiments; (iii) a quantitative
assessment of the role of monetary policy in the Great Moderation episode.
There are several important facts that our investigation uncovers. We show that the
transmission of policy shocks has been relatively stable over time and detect signiﬁcant
changes - which make monetary shocks more powerful in aﬀecting inﬂation and real activity
- only in the latter part of the sample. As in Sims and Zha (2006), we ﬁnd posterior evidence
of a considerable decrease in the variance of the policy shock. However, we document that
policy shocks explain a small fraction of the average variability and persistence of output
growth and inﬂation and that the decline in inﬂation variability comes from sources other
than the monetary policy shocks. Our posterior analysis does not support the idea that
monetary policy has become signiﬁcantly more aggressive in ﬁghting inﬂation since the
early 1980s, nor do we ﬁnd overwhelming evidence that a weak response of interest rates to
inﬂation is suﬃcient to explain the 1970s. However, we do ﬁnd that the posterior median
of the long run inﬂation coeﬃcient in the policy equation was low in the 1970s, and that
increased after Volker was appointed chairman of the Fed. Finally, we show that a more
aggressive inﬂation policy would have reduced the level and the persistence of inﬂation, but
the output growth costs would have been substantial.
Since our results go against several preconceived notions present in the literature, it is
important to highlight what features of our analysis may be responsible for the diﬀerences.
First, our analysis uses a structural model while previous studies, which used the same level
of econometric sophistication (such as Cogley and Sargent, 2001, 2005), have concentrated
on reduced form estimates and used the timing of the observed changes to infer the contri-
bution of monetary policy to changes in output growth and inﬂation. Our approach allows
not only an informal evaluation but also to quantify a-posteriori the relationship between
monetary policy, output and inﬂation dynamics. Second, relative to earlier studies such as
16Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Leeper and Zha (2003), or Hanson (2006), which use subsam-
ple analysis to characterize policy changes, we are able to precisely track the evolution of
the coeﬃcients over time and produce a more complete and reliable picture of the relatively
minor variations present in the policy stance in the US.
Our results are in line with those obtained recursively estimating a small scale DSGE
model with Bayesian methods (see Canova, 2005) and are somewhat in contrast with those
of Boivin and Giannoni (2006), who use an indirect inference principle to estimate the para-
meters of a DSGE model over two subsamples. Apart from the fact that the counterfactuals
they run are poorly designed, some of the diﬀerences could be due to the identiﬁcation prob-
lems that their estimation approach faces for the model they consider (see Canova and Sala
(2006) for details). Finally, our results are consistent with those of Sims and Zha (2006),
despite the fact that, in that paper, variations in both the coeﬃcients and the variance are
accounted for with a Markov switching methodology. Relative to their work, our analysis
emphasizes that factors other than monetary policy could be more important in explain-
ing the structural changes in the US and provides a direct quantitative measure of the
contribution of monetary policy to the ”Great Moderation” episode.
Overall, while our analysis indicates that the crudest version of the ”bad policy” hy-
pothesis has low posterior support, the evidence we uncovered is consistent both with more
sophisticated versions of this proposition (see Schorfheide (2005)) as well as with several
alternative hypotheses present in the literature. In particular, the conjecture that there
have been structural changes in the private sector behavior seems an interesting one. We
plan to study this hypothesis in future work.
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Gibbs sampling algorithm
• Step 1: sample from p(σT|yT,θT,φ T,Ω,Ξ,Ψ,s T)
To draw σT we use the algorithm of Kim, Shephard and Chibb (KSC) (1998). Consider





t ut,w h e r eut ∼ N(0,I), Xt =( In ⊗x0
t),
and xt =[ 1 n,y t−1...yt−p]. Conditional on yT,θT,a n dφT, y∗
t is observable. Squaring and
taking the logarithm, we obtain
y∗∗
t =2 rt + υt (9)
rt = rt−1 + ξt (10)
where y∗∗
i,t =l o g ( ( y∗
i,t)2 +0 .001) - KSC add the constant (0.001) to make estimation robust
- υi,t =l o g ( u2
i,t) and rt =l o gσi,t. Since, the innovation in (9) is distributed as logχ2(1),w e
use a mixture of 7 normal densities with component probabilities qj,m e a n smj − 1.2704,
and variances v2
j (j=1,...,7) to transform the system in a Gaussian one, where {qj,m j,v2
j}
are chosen to match the moments of the logχ2(1) distribution. The values are:
jq j mj v2
j
1.0000 0.0073 -10.1300 5.7960
2.0000 0.1056 -3.9728 2.6137
3.0000 0.0000 -8.5669 5.1795
4.0000 0.0440 2.7779 0.1674
5.0000 0.3400 0.6194 0.6401
6.0000 0.2457 1.7952 0.3402
7.0000 0.2575 -1.0882 1.2626
Let sT =[ s1,...,s T]0 be a matrix of indicator variables selecting at each point in time
the member of the mixture to be used for each element of υt. Conditional on sT, (υi,t|si,t =
j) ∼ N(mj −1.2704,v2
j). Therefore we can use the algorithm of Carter and Kohn (1994) to
draw rt (t=1,...,T) from N(rt|t+1,R t|t+1),w h e r ert|t+1 = E(rt|rt+1,yt,θT,φ T,Ω,Ξ,Ψ,s T,)
and Rt|t+1 = Va r(rt|rt+1,yt,θT,φ T,Ω,Ξ,Ψ,s T).
• Step 2: sample from p(sT|yT,θT,σT,φ T,Ω,Ξ,Ψ)
Conditional on y∗∗
i,t and rT, we independently sample each si,t from the discrete density
deﬁned by Pr(si,t = j|y∗∗
i,t,r i,t) ∝ fN(y∗∗
i,t|2ri,t +mj −1.2704,v2
j),w h e r efN(y|μ,σ2) denotes
a normal density with mean μ and variance σ2.
18• Step 3: sample from p(φT|yT,θT,σT,Ω,Ξ,Ψ,s T)
Consider again the system of equations F−1
t (yt −X0
tθt)=F−1
t ˆ yt = D
1/2
t ut. Conditional
on θT, ˆ yt is observable. Since F−1
t is lower triangular with ones in the main diagonal, each
equation in the above system can be written as
ˆ y1,t = σ1,tu1,t (11)
ˆ yi,t = −ˆ y[1,i−1],tφi,t + σi,tui,t i =2 ,...,n (12)
where σi,t and ui,t are the ith elements of σt and ut respectively, ˆ y[1,i−1],t =[ ˆ y1,t,...,ˆ yi−1,t].
Under diagonality of Ψ, the algorithm of Carter and Kohn (1994) can be applied equa-
tion by equation, obtaining draws for φi,t from a N(φi,t|t+1,Φi,t|t+1),w h e r eφi,t|t+1 =
E(φi,t|φi,t+1,yt,θT,σT,Ω,Ξ,Ψ) and Φi,t|t+1 = Va r(φi,t|φi,t+1,yt,θT,σT,Ω,Ξ,Ψ).
• Step 4: sample from p(θT|yT,σT,φ T,Ω,Ξ,Ψ,s T)
Conditional on all other parameters and the observables we have
yt = X0
tθt + εt (13)
θt = θt−1 + ωt (14)
Draws for θt can be obtained from a N(θt|t+1,P t|t+1),w h e r eθt|t+1 = E(θt|θt+1,yT,σT,φ T,Ω,Ξ,Ψ)
and Pt|t+1 = Va r(θt|θt+1,yT,σT,φ T,Ω,Ξ,Ψ) are obtained with the algorithm of Carter and
Kohn (1994).
• Step 5: sample from p(Ω|yT,θT,σT,φ T,Ξ,Ψ,s T)
Conditional on the other coeﬃcients and the data, Ω has an Inverse-Wishart distribu-
tion with scale matrix Ω1 = df Ω0Ω0 + ∆θt(∆θt)0. To draw a realization for Ω make df Ω1
independent draws zi (i=1,...,df Ω1), where df Ω1 = df Ω0 + T,f r o mN(0,Ω−1
1 ) and compute
Ω =
Pdf Ω1
i=1 zi (see Gelman et. al., 1995).
• Step 6: sample from p(Ξi,i|yT,θT,σT,φ T,Ω,Ψ,s T)
Conditional the other coeﬃcients and the data, Ξ has an Inverse-Wishart distribution
with scale matrix Ξ1 = df Ξ0Ξ0 + ∆logσt(∆logσt)0. Draws are obtained as in step 5.
• Step 7: sample from p(Ψ|yT,θT,σT,φ T,Ω,Ξ,s T).
These volatilities can be drawn separately for each (i=1,...,n). Conditional on the other
coeﬃcients and the data, Ψi h a si nf a c ta nI n v e r s e - W i s h a r td i s t r i b u t i o nw i t hs c a l em a t r i x
Ψi,1 = df Ψi,0Ψi,0 + ∆φi,t(∆φi,t)0.D r a w sa r eo b t a i n e da si ns t e p5 .
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